The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy by Adler, Erwin E. & Broiles, Steven A.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1986
The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social
Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the
Insurance Policy
Erwin E. Adler
Steven A. Broiles
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin E. Adler & Steven A. Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance
Policy, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1251 (1986).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol19/iss4/7
THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION:
IMPLEMENTING THE SOCIAL POLICY OF
PREVENTING POLLUTION THROUGH
THE INSURANCE POLICY
Erwin E. Adler* and Steven A. Broiles**
In recent years, as this country attempts to restore the natural envi-
ronment following decades of pollution, the insurance industry increas-
ingly has become the focus of environmental litigation. The insurance
policy pollution exclusion was designed to implement the social policy of
discouraging business practices which harm the environment. However,
implementation of this social policy is thwarted when courts nonetheless
impose environmental clean-up costs on an active polluter's business
insurer.
Recently, various courts have held insurance companies liable for
pollution damage under policies of general liability insurance routinely
issued to commercial and business entities since the late 1960's. At that
time, however, insureds believed that this risk was specifically excluded
from coverage; similarly, insurers never charged for that risk when col-
lecting premiums. This mutual understanding between insurers and in-
sureds was consistent with legislation enacted by one state almost two
decades ago to create an economic disincentive to pollute by prohibiting
insurance coverage for pollution damage.' Insurers in that state and
others generally cooperated by excluding such coverage from their
policies.2
The social policy underlying this legislation and the pollution exclu-
sions clause was to discourage conduct by insureds which might result in
environmental pollution. As the scope of these insurance policies is liti-
gated today, however, certain courts are inadvertently rewarding irre-
* Partner, Richards, Watson, Dreyfuss & Gershon, Los Angeles, California. J.D. 1966,
Harvard University; LL.M. 1967, University of Michigan. Mr. Adler is Vice Chairman of the
American Bar Association Appellate Advocacy Committee.
** Partner, Richards, Watson, Dreyfuss & Gershon, Los Angeles, California. J.D. 1965,
University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Broiles was formerly Deputy County Counsel for Riv-
erside County, and District Counsel for the South Coast Air Quality Management District.
1. N.Y. A.B. 6952, 1971-72 Reg. Sess. (1971) (introduced by Assem. Harris) (originally
codified at N.Y. INS. LAW § 46) (currently codified as amended at N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113
(McKinney 1985)). See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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sponsible corporate behavior. By failing to consider the pollution
exclusion clause's underlying purpose, a disproportionate share of envi-
ronmental clean-up costs is being imposed on the insurance industry.3
The varying judicial interpretations of the exclusion's applicability and
scope illustrate the general lack of appreciation of the underlying social
policy issue that led to its inclusion in most insurance contracts.
California, like other states, attempts to protect the environment
through an extensive scheme of legislation which imposes the basic cost
of pollution upon the entity or entities best able to prevent the pollution.4
The pollution exclusion implements that regulatory philosophy by moti-
vating business executives to consider the direct economic costs of envi-
ronmental damage before acting. Thus, the executive, knowing that he
cannot shift the cost of the company's socially incompatible behavior to
someone else, is much less likely to become a polluter. Furthermore, any
costs incurred by a business in eliminating pollution can be passed on to
the consumers of its products or services. The marketplace, therefore,
determines whether the social benefits and costs of that product or ser-
vice (including its pollution control) outweigh its utility value to the
consumer.
This Article traces the development of the pollution exclusion, ex-
amines its underlying social policy, and discusses how the inconsistent
judicial interpretations of the exclusion have resulted from the judiciary's
failure to recognize or acknowledge this policy. It suggests that consis-
tent judicial recognition of the exclusion's social policy would facilitate
responsible corporate decision-making in the environmental context.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE
To understand the judicial treatment of the pollution exclusion
clause, it is necessary to review both the historical use of insurance to
support regulatory policy goals and to examine the development of the
3. In 1984, property and casualty insurers suffered a net loss of $3.55 billion, the first net
loss for the insurance industry since the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. This loss was due
in part to the narrow judicial interpretation of the standard pollution exclusion. As a result of
this and other uncertainties arising out of the scope of liability under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub, L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 22, 33, 42, 49 U.S.C.),
pollution coverage is being withdrawn from the market. See EPA Standards Applicable to
Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities: Lia-
bility Coverage, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,902 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 264-265) (pro-
posed Aug. 21, 1985) [hereinafter cited as EPA Proposed Stds. of Liability Coverage].
4. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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exclusion clause in typical forms of insurance policies available during
the past fifteen years.
A. Typical Insurance Coverage
1. The comprehensive general liability policy
The comprehensive general liability policy (CGL) was first devel-
oped in 1966 to replace the earlier "accident" policy form. CGL policies
provide insurance coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this [insurance] applies, caused by an occurrence, and
the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage... ."' "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including injuri-
ous exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period in
bodily injury orproperty damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured."
6
Under the CGL policy, the insurer's duties to defend and indemnify
arise when an injury occurs during the policy period. Neither the event
causing the injury nor the actual filing of a claim need occur during the
policy period.
a. the CGL pollution exclusion clause
Beginning in June 1970, insurance companies voluntarily attempted
to exclude liability coverage under CGL policies for environmental dam-
age caused by the release of pollutants or hazardous substances, except
for "sudden and accidental" pollution.7 The insurance industry's efforts
paralleled novel legislation enacted in New York,8 and initially took the
form of an endorsement excluding coverage for:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or other pollutants into or upon
5. See American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1551-52
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (emphasis added). See generally Wilmarth, Outline of Insurance Develop-
ments, in 21 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 23, 23-26 (Summer 1971).
6. See Steyer v. Westvacs Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Md. 1978) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See generally Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 23-26.
7. See generally McGeough, The Applicability of Liability Insurance Coverage to Actions
Involving Environmental Damage, 1971 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGL. AND COMPENSATION LAW
312.
8. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of this New York
legislation.
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land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape is "sudden and accidental" .... 9
By 1973, most standard CGL policies included this language as an
exclusion.10 While coverage was intended to apply to liability arising out
of a spill or other accident whose effects were known reasonably soon
after the occurrence, problems arose when the effects were not known
until years after the event or where there was gradual seepage. 1 As a
result of the unpredictable judicial interpretation of the pollution exclu-
sion clause, the standard CGL policy recently has been revised in an
attempt to exclude coverage for all pollution damage claims.' 2
b. history of the pollution exclusion clause
At about the same time insurers were rewriting the CGL to exclude
certain pollution hazards, the State of New York began efforts to pre-
clude insurance coverage for polluters. These efforts culminated in 1971
with the passage of legislation prohibiting pollution liability coverage. 3
9. See Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 25-26 (quoting exclusion endorsement clause utilized by
Insurance Rating Board).
10. Following the court in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 223 n.2 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. Me. 1980), we refer to the general pollution provisions as "exclusions" and to any
limitations on the scope of the exclusions as "exceptions."
11. These problems are beyond the scope of this Article. They are briefly considered be-
low, see infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text, but warrant separate treatment.
12. The proposed 1986 Insurance Services Office (ISO) Commercial General Liability Pol-
icy (Exclusion F) reads:
This insurance shall not apply to:
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the actual, alleged or
threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants:
(a) at or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) at or from any site or location used by or for you or others for the handling,
storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste;
(c) which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of, or
processed as waste by or for you or any person or organization for whom you may be
legally responsible; or
(d) at or from any site or location on which you or any contractors or subcontrac-
tors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in connection with
such operations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants, means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, in-
cluding smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste in-
cludes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
The Defense Research Institute, Inc., Course Book No. 85-3, Environmental and Hazardous
Waste Litigation, at H-27 (Apr. 11-12, 1985) (unpublished reference provided at DRI Defense
Practice Seminar in Boston, Mass.).
13. N.Y. A.B. 6952, 1971-72 Reg. Sess. (1971) (introduced by Assem. Harris) (originally
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Pollution exclusion clauses most commonly found in insurance policies
written between 1973 and 1986 generally follow the form proposed as an
amendment14 to section 46 of New York's Insurance Law.15
The bill, when introduced, carried Governor Rockefeller's recom-
mendation.16 His message described New York's great concern for envi-
ronmental values and also articulated the need to preclude polluters from
shifting the consequences of their actions to insurers. His message is ap-
plicable to any state concerned with eliminating pollution:
New York state has adopted stringent standards to pro-
hibit despoiling the environment through the discharge of nox-
ious substances into the water and air. These standards, which
are the most comprehensive in the Nation, go far beyond
merely strengthening and supplementing the common law rules
against pollution.
As strict as these laws are, however, their effectiveness
could be substantially reduced if polluters were to purchase in-
surance to protect themselves from having to pay the fines and
other liabilities that may be imposed upon them for polluting
the environment.
For example, a polluting corporation might continue to
pollute the environment if it could buy protection from poten-
tial liability for only the small cost of an annual insurance pre-
mium, whereas, it might stop polluting, if it had to risk bearing
... the full penalty for violating the law.
17
The Governor further analyzed the interrelationship between the availa-
bility of insurance coverage and the need to place the full burden of pol-
lution costs upon the polluter:
Many insurance companies have voluntarily initiated ac-
codified at N.Y. INS. LAW § 46) (currently codified as amended at N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113
(McKinney 1985)).
14. A.B. 6952 of the 1971-1972 regular session contained a proposed amendment to the
definition of "personal injury liability insurance" found in § 46(13) of New York's Insurance
Law that read as follows:
Policies issued to commercial or industrial enterprises providing insurance against
the legal liabilities specified in this subdivision shall expressly exclude therefrom lia-
bility arising out of pollution or contamination caused by the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of any pollutants, irritants or contaminants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water unless such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
15. Section 46 of the New York Insurance Law is now codified at N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113
(McKinney 1985).
16. Governor's Program Bill, Program Bill No. 42, at 1 (1971).
17. Id. at 353-54.
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tion to protect the environment by refusing to insure against
liability arising out of environment pollution.
The bill would help to assure that corporate polluters bear
the full burden of their own actions spoiling the environment,
and would preclude any insurance company from undermining
public policy by offering this type of insurance protection.' 8
New York's then recently formed Department of Environmental
Conservation supported the bill for similar reasons:
It is the belief of this Department that if polluters are allowed
to purchase insurance to protect themselves from paying fines
and other liabilities which will be imposed upon them for pol-
luting the environment, that the effectiveness of a
strengthen[ed] enforcement program will be diminished. To
make a clean environment a reality, corporate polluters must
bear the full cost of despoiling the environment. 9
New York's policy of statutorily precluding any type of insurance
for environmental damage has not, to our knowledge, been adopted by
any other state. But numerous other states have generally followed New
York's lead by enacting extremely stringent environmental pollution
laws and imposing clean-up costs on the polluter.20 New York's efforts,
moreover, did prompt the insurance industry to include the pollution ex-
clusion clause in most CGL policies written at that time.2'
It is worth noting that while the New York legislature was consider-
ing adoption of legislation precluding pollution insurance, the state's
18. Id. at 354.
19. Memorandum from Henry L. Diamond, Envt'l Conservation Comm'r, Dep't of Envt'l
Conservation to N.Y. Senate (June 18, 1971) (filed with Committee on Rules in support of
N.Y. S.B. 7042, 1971-72 Reg. Sess. (1971)).
20. For a thorough summary of state environmental laws, see Office of Domestic Fin.,
U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. PB82-188236, Hazardous Substance Liability Insurance, at app.
B-2 (Mar. 1982), reprinted in NAT'L TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY INSURANCE, at app. 193-202 (Mar. 1982) [here-
inafter cited as HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY INSURANCE].
21. See Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174
(1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1981). The bill was designed to encourage all
insurers not to provide insurance for pollution. Memorandum from Roger W. Tompkins,
Deputy Superintendent and Gen. Counsel of the N.Y. Ins. Dep't to Gov. Rockefeller (June 15,
1971) (filed with Committee on Rules in support of N.Y. S.B. 7042, 1971-72 Reg. Sess.
(1971)). "[T]he effect of those laws [prohibiting pollution] may be substantially reduced if
polluters may purchase insurance to protect themselves from having to pay fines and other
liabilities that may be imposed upon them for their actions." Id. at 2. Commissioner
Tompkins noted that Governor Rockefeller had been urging enactment of such a regulation
since 1970 and that although certain insurers had voluntarily agreed to include exclusions for
polluters, "[tlhis legislation should serve to further motivate all commercial and industrial
enterprises to preserve and protect the environment." Id.
1256
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Commerce Department recognized that neither the state's commercial
and industrial businesses nor the state's extensive insurance industry op-
posed adoption of the legislation.22 In fact, only two power companies-
which have long been accused of insensitivity to environmental con-
cerns-filed written opposition to the legislation.23
In summary, the social policy that underlies the only statute on the
subject and the related language of the CGL pollution exclusion clause is
directed toward influencing corporate management decisions before a
business harms the environment. The purpose was to make corporate
managers aware that they, and not their insurers, would have to pay for
the consequences of their failure to adequately protect the environment.
Accordingly, the regulated community would be stimulated to adopt
practices protective of the environment while pursuing their business ac-
tivities rather than ignoring the possible long term environmental conse-
quences of their acts.
2. Environmental impairment liability policies
Another type of currently issued environmental insurance policy is
the environmental impairment liability (EIL) policy. EIL policies must
be distinguished from CGL policies, which include the pollution exclu-
sion clause. First issued in 1977, EIL policies are issued on a "claims-
made" basis rather than on an "occurrence" basis. Under a claims-made
basis, the policy covers any claim made for injuries arising from environ-
mental pollution during the period of coverage. Some EIL policies limit
the number of years prior to the claim when an occurrence must have
happened for the policy to cover the claim. The scope of such limitation
clauses, as well as other standard deductible, annual, aggregate and self-
insured retention provisions, are subject to negotiation between the car-
rier and its insured, and vary from policy to policy.
No policy presently written completely matches the liability expo-
sure of a "responsible party" under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).24 CERCLA
22. See Memorandum from Henry J. O'Donald, First Deputy Commissioner to N.Y. As-
sembly 3 (June 24, 1971) (filed with Committee on Insurance in support of N.Y. A.B. 6952,
1971-72 Reg. Sess. (1971)).
23. See Letter from Edwin J. Walsh, Attorney for Long Island Lighting Co., to Michael
Whitman, Counsel to the Governor (June 18, 1971); Letter from Walter J. Barrett, Attorney
for Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., to Michael Whitman, Counsel to the Governor (June 17,
1971) (filed with Committee on Insurance in support of N.Y. A.B. 6952, 1971-72 Reg. Sess.
(1971)).
24. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
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imposes financial liability for "removal" and "remedial" clean-up CoStS. 25
Because of the open-ended nature of such clean-up costs,26 they are not
generally covered by insurance. Insurance is, however, generally avail-
able to cover exposure under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)2 7 and non-intentional tort liability.
Some EIL insurance policies are specifically designed to cover third-
party damages caused by pollution. Insurers generally investigate a site
and assess the potential environmental impact resulting from a particular
business operation before issuing such policies. Absent such a review, no
insurance underwriter can hope to quantify the potential risk associated
with a particular business enterprise. Of course, if management chooses,
in conjunction with its insurer, to decrease the hazards of environmental
pollution, the business enterprise saves a portion of the premium it would
otherwise have to spend. Conversely, the insurer has decreased the risk
it will assume under the insurance policy ultimately issued. The overall
benefit to society is, of course, the decreased probability of the degrada-
tion of our soil, air and water.
The cost of preparing a written risk assessment or survey upon
which the underwriter will accept or reject an applicant for pollution
coverage is borne by the applicant. Applicants for EIL policies are lim-
ited to the current owner or operator of a site. No insurance is presently
available for former owners or operators. All EIL policy forms contain
important exclusions and each form must be considered from this stand-
point.28 Because the EIL policy is written in conjunction with a site in-
spection by the insurer, the exclusions which are included in such
policies implement the general desire that the risks of environmental pol-
lution are to be borne by the operator.
Most forms of EIL policies exclude liability for claims arising from
conduct which the insured, or its directors, officers or responsible em-
ployees, actually know does not comply with the law. Some forms ex-
clude loss arising from any condition giving rise to pollution if any
director, officer or other management person knew, or could reasonably
CLA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
16, 26, 33, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
25. CERCLA § 101 (23)-(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (1982).
26. Costs imposed under CERCLA include "necessary expenses" of third persons, id.
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), and "natural resource damages" assessed under the direction
of federal officials, id. §§ 102(16), 111(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602(16), 961 l(H)(1) (1982).
27. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 92 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985)).
28. EIL policy coverages are generally described in HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY
INSURANCE, supra note 20, at app. 212-28.
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have foreseen, that such a condition would give rise to a claim. The ap-
plication forms relating to such policies contain much the same type of
limitation of liability language.
Some EIL policies may also exclude various types of injury. All
policies exclude coverage for nuclear hazards. Some forms exclude cov-
erage for genetic damage. Most forms exclude liability arising under a
contract or agreement; whether this would include a contractual indem-
nification or settlement agreement is an interesting (and unlitigated)
question.
There may also be exclusions for the type of relief sought. For ex-
ample, some EIL policies exclude claims for non-pecuniary, injunctive
relief. Others accomplish the same result by referring only to damage
coverage. In a related context, most EIL policies specifically exclude
coverage for fines, penalties and punitive damages. Similarly, most forms
do not cover damage to property owned or used by the insured.
Finally, almost all forms of EIL policies attempt to preclude cover-
age for claims broader than environmental impairment. For example, all
forms exclude workers' compensation or work-related claims29 and ex-
clude product liability claims.30 The Insurance Services Office (ISO) is
preparing a new form of policy covering all pollution incidents, both sud-
den or gradual, on behalf of major insurance companies.3 ' The 1981 ISO
policy form was designed to accommodate the insurance needs of owners
and/or operators of facilities which generate, store, treat or process haz-
ardous materials and wastes. It excludes from coverage the cost to clean-
up a site owned, operated or used by the insured as well as liability ema-
nating from any site which is no longer in active use.3 2
3. The interrelationship of the ElL policy to the CGL policy
The availability of pollution insurance under an EIL policy under-
scores the intention of insurers to generally exclude pollution coverage
from the scope of CGL policies. Indeed, this proposition is supported by
the most recent case addressing the issue: "[T]he existence of such [EIL]
coverage is enlightening concerning the underwriters' understanding of
the scope of coverage in the [CGL] liability policy [the insured] did
29. See Comm. on Business Management Liab. Ins. of the ABA Section of Corp., Banking
and Business Law, Liability Insurance Against Environmental Damage: A Status Report-
June 1982, 38 Bus. LAW. 217, 222-23 (1982) for a discussion of these exclusions.
30. Id.
31. See HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 20, at app. 231-34.
32. Id.
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have."33
A number of other courts, however, in'considering the scope of an
insurer's duties under CGL policies to defend and indemnify the insured
in actions brought by third parties for pollution injuries,34 have errone-
ously interpreted CGL policy coverage to be as broad as EIL policy
coverage.35
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
A. Judicial Non-recognition of the Exclusion's
Underlying Social Policy
The social policy of influencing the decisions of corporate managers
before they act generally has not been the central theme of reported deci-
sions construing the pollution exclusion clause.36 Regrettably, few deci-
sions have focused as sharply upon the underlying policy issues as has
the most recent decision in this area, Waste Management of Carolinas v.
Peerless Insurance Co. :37
The policy reasons for the pollution exclusion are obvious:
if an insured knows that liability incurred by all manner of neg-
ligent or careless spills and releases is covered by his liability
policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his
vigilance. Relaxed vigilance is even more likely where the in-
sured knows that the intentional deposit of toxic material in his
dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him coverage. In
this case, it pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.
In addition, putting the financial responsibility for pollu-
tion that may occur over the course of time upon the insured
places the responsibility to guard against such occurrences
upon the party with the most control over the circumstances
33. Waste Management of Carolina, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 70PA85, slip op. at n.5
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986 on LEXIS, States library, NC file).
34. See, e.g., Sellers v. Seligman, 463 So. 2d 697, 702 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 464 So.
2d 1379 (1985) (material issue of fact existed as to whether sandblaster's inhalation of silica
dust while performing his duties fell within terms of pollution exclusion clause, precluding
summary judgment).
35. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
36. But cf Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427 N.Y.2d 171
(1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
37. No. 70PA85 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, States
library, NC file).
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most likely to cause the pollution.38
The policy of affecting corporate decision-makers at the time they
act is, of course, related directly to the perceived level of certainty by the
public that our legal system will enforce that social policy. The United
States Department of the Treasury, in its massive analysis of hazardous
substance liability insurance, recognized that the certain unavailability of
insurance coverage for active polluters directly impacts the corporate de-
cision-maker.39 In that context, the Treasury Department concluded
that:
[The] degree to which liability systems provide incentives to re-
sponsible parties for greater levels of care will depend to a cer-
tain extent on how easily that liability can be shifted to some
other party as guarantor. If liability can be shifted to another
party only with great difficulty (for reasons of cost, terms and
conditions, or whatever) the more likely it is to serve as a dis-
incentive for participation in the activity at issue and vice-
versa.
40
The corporate "disincentive for participation in the [polluting] activity at
issue ' 4 1 is the focal point for analysis of the pollution exclusion clause set
forth below.
Unfortunately, most courts that have disregarded the social policy
underlying the pollution exclusion clause relied upon maxims of contract
construction developed in the interpretation of automobile insurance pol-
icies or other nonbusiness activities. These courts thus ignored the busi-
ness sophistication of the insured in addressing the pollution exclusion
question. This major issue has been obscured by judicial platitudes such
as a "contract of insurance prepared and phrased by the insurer is to be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer
... ,2 Similarly, the disincentive to pollute which motivated the crea-
tion of the pollution exclusion, has been ignored by courts looking for a
deep pocket to finance environmental clean-up. The imposition of such
costs on insurers is justified by the finding of some "doubt" or "ambigu-
ity" in the clause which must be resolved in favor of the insured. 3
38. Id.
39. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 20, at 14.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Buckeye Union Ins. v. Liberty Solvent & Chem. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984).
43. See, e.g., Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 323
S.E.2d 726 (1984), review granted, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985), rev'd, No. 70PA85,
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986 on LEXIS, States library, NC file).
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The judiciary's general failure to focus upon the context in which
business decisions are made is to some degree understandable. Society
does not challenge most corporate business decisions affecting the envi-
ronment. The relatively few decisions which are challenged do not often
result in litigation; the complaining parties content themselves with a let-
ter to corporate management or, possibly, a local newspaper or chamber
of commerce. Few of the business decisions actually challenged in court
result in a final judgment, and even fewer of these receive appellate
review.
The business decision that may result in environmental pollution is
not comparable to conduct which may result in an automobile accident.
Automobile usage is generally unaffected by the judicial interpretation of
auto insurance policy terms, while corporate decision-making is often in-
fluenced by judicial decisions on business matters. The automobile acci-
dent therefore does not provide an adequate conceptual basis for
analyzing the social necessity of influencing corporate decision-making
on environmental issues.
To reach the conclusion that environmental damage is covered
'under an insurance policy, the courts virtually have ignored the social
policy which the pollution exclusion clause implements. Moreover, the
courts doing so have held either that the pollution exclusion clause is not
involved,' or that the accidental discharge exception to the pollution
exclusion clause applies.45
The exception provides that the exclusion "does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden or accidental."46 Several
courts maintain that this exception was intended to apply to liability aris-
ing out of a discharge which was "accidental" from the viewpoint of the
insured and if its effects were known reasonably soon after the event.47
Other courts purport to apply the exception where the discharge was
intentional although the resulting injury was not,48 especially where the
44. See Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95
(Ala. 1977) (sand and dirt washed by storm waters on neighboring land not a specified pollu-
tant); A-1 Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 1377
(1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 176, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982) (injury to vehicles as a result of overspray
while painting bridge not environmental pollution).
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
47. See Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d
520 (1975) (oil seepage into river due to discharge caused by vandals), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super.
433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976), certif denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977); Evans v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 710, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1981) (discharge of gasoline from
above ground tank caused by vandals).
48. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980) (exception to policy
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effects have taken months or years to manifest themselves.4 9
The reasoning typically followed by a court in emasculating the pol-
lution exclusion clause begins with finding the pollution clause ambigu-
ous50 in order to construe it in a manner favorable to the insured. The
court then interprets the words "sudden and accidental" as requiring the
pollution-causing event to happen at a particular point in time.5" Once
the court construes the exception to the pollution exclusion to be as
broad as the policy coverage provision, the exclusion disappears. The
pollution exclusion clause is thus identical in operation to the intentional
injury exclusion 52 -it is coextensive with the definition of "occurrence."
exclusion was not limited to a "sudden and accidental" release of pollutants, where insured's
operation of industrial waste facility led to contamination of plaintiff's well water); CPS Chem.
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (1984) (coverage extended to
generator of illegally dumped toxic waste), rev'd, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (1985);
Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156,
451 A.2d 990 (1982) (coverage not excluded to site owner/operator for intentional landfill
disposal of industrial and municipal waste that eventually contaminated underground water
supply); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477
N.E.2d 1227 (1984) (duty to defend hazardous waste generator in CERCLA action for clean-
up of contaminated disposal site). Cf. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Town Pump, Inc., 692 P.2d
427, 428 (1984) (coverage for gasoline contamination of wells from leaking underground pipe
after insured became "aware of potential gasoline leakage"); Niagara County v. Utica Mut.
Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981) (owner of leaking landfill not alleged to
have been responsible for disposal of polluting substance). Contra Great Lakes Container
Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (exclusion upheld as to
pollution injuries caused by insured's barrel reconditioning operation); American States Ins.
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (exclusion upheld
where insured produced and disposed of toxic waste as a "natural and usual part of its
business").
49. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (1984) (parking
garage alleged to have permitted carbon monoxide and soot to regularly enter adjacent condo-
minium unit at diverse times); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648,
477 N.E.2d 146 (1985) (oil leaked from a progressively corroded underground tank into sur-
rounding waterways); City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 206
N.W.2d 632 (1973) (pollution of irrigation well due to seepage from city sewer); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980) (gradual discharge of gasoline
from storage tank into adjacent property); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, 34
Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983) (gasoline leaked from underground pipe over several
months).
50. Courts upholding the pollution exclusion clause typically find it not to be ambiguous.
See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33 (1st
Cir. 1984).
51. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 82 N.C. App. 80, 323 S.E.
2d 726, 732 (1984), review granted, 313 N.C. 612, 339 S.E.2d 616 (1985), rev'd, No. 70PA85
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, States Library, NC file).
52. See Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289
N.E.2d 360 (1972) (coverage denied for air pollution damage from emissions over a period of
seven years where insured was aware of damage and failed to correct condition when requested
to do so).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1251
Such an interpretation is repugnant to the statutory policy of those
states, such as California, which preclude insurance coverage for any
willfully inflicted injury.1
3
. Defining Key Policy Terms
Although few courts have focused specifically upon the social policy
implications of their decisions, a number have been concerned indirectly
with this issue in two separate contexts, both relating to standard terms
in CGL policies: (1) the definitions of "intent" and "accident" and
(2) the definition of "pollutant."
1. The "intent" and "accident" definitions
The courts have engaged in an analysis of "intent" to resolve ques-
tions arising under the definition of "occurrence" in the CGL pollution
exclusion clause.54 To be a covered "occurrence," the event must have
been "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured."" A similar analysis has involved the exception to the pollution
exclusion for acts which are "sudden and accidental."'56
When focusing upon the question of "intent," courts refer occasion-
ally to the social purpose of affecting management decisions. For exam-
ple, one court, in the context of New York's statutory environmental
insurance exclusion, noted:
The clear purpose of the statutorily required exclusion is to
strengthen New York's environmental protection standards by
imposing the full risk of loss due to personal injury or property
damage from pollution upon the commercial or industrial en-
terprise that does the polluting and by eliminating the enter-
prise's option of spreading that risk through insurance
coverage. 57
Courts in other states have also referred to the "purpose" of the exclu-
53. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985). Section
533 of the California Insurance Code provides that: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused
by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of
the insured's agents or others." CAL. INS. CODE § 533. Section 1668 of the Civil Code, in a
similar vein, provides that: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or prop-
erty of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668.
54. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. Autotronic Sys. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 403, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505-
06 (1982) (citations omitted).
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sion as eliminating protection of the "active polluter. 5 8
The distinction between those commercial entities entitled to insur-
ance coverage for their environmentally harmful acts and those not so
entitled should be predicated upon social policy. Thus, it is helpful to
analyze the meaning of corporate intent in that context rather than
mechanical reference to a facile formula derived from the automobile ac-
cident context.59
The law generally recognizes that intent is a probabilistic analysis.
If one pulls the trigger of a loaded gun while aiming it at someone, the
law presumes he or she intended the natural consequence of his or her
action: the death and/or serious injury of another.' Similarly, if a per-
son picks up a loaded gun and shoots into a crowd, he or she will be held
accountable for the foreseeable harm resulting from his or her conduct.
In short, criminal defendants will not be heard to say that they did not
intend the consequences of their voluntary conduct which, in the ordi-
nary course of events, creates a high probability of serious harm to
others.6" It is, of course, this same probabilistic type of analysis which
resulted in the murder convictions of a corporation and its executives for
an employee's death resulting from cyanide in the work environment.62
The intent analysis involves a consideration of the foreseeability and
probability of harm to others likely to result as a consequence of the
person's action. In the environmental context, it is thus helpful to nar-
row the analytic focus to the following question: When the corporation
undertook the action resulting in the pollution complained of, what was
the probability of environmental harm resulting to others? If the
probability of harm was high, even if it could not be said to be damaging
to a complete certainty, coverage for that conduct should be excluded by
58. See, e.g., Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d
95 (Ala. 1977); Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990, 993-99 (1982); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363
(1976), certif denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
59. See infra text preceding note 87.
60. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 665 (West 1966), which provides that "[a] person is
presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act."
61. See, e.g., Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 1049 (1927) (defendant convicted of
manslaughter for shooting into water next to boat causing an occupant to leap overboard,
upset boat, and thereby cause other occupants to drown).
62. People v. Film Recovery Sys., Nos. 83-11091, 84-5064 (Cook County Cir. Ct. of Ill.
June 14, 1985) (three executives found guilty of murder and sentenced to serve up to 25 years
in prison and to pay over $50,000 in fines). The trial court's decision is discussed in Spiegel,
The Liability of Corporate Officers, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 48, and Note, Corporations Can
Kill Too: After Film Recovery Are Individuals Accountable for Corporate Crimes?, 19 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. - (1986) (included in this issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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the pollution exclusion clause.63 If the probability of harm was low, the
event should be insurable.
Although the dispositive language of the reported decisions has not
been consistent," a number of decisions clearly indicate the courts' im-
plicit adoption of this probabilistic type of analysis. In considering
whether a claim was insurable, the courts have considered whether a par-
ticular event was the result of corporate action which had a high or low
probability of causing environmental damage. Two examples are helpful
in illuminating the probabilistic analysis.
Case No. 1: In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protec-
tion,65 oil spilled from Lansco's tanks into the Hackensack River, damag-
ing it and adjacent bodies of water. The spill was caused by the
intentional acts of vandals, not by the failure of corporate management to
provide appropriate environmental safeguards.66 Under these facts, the
court properly determined that the pollution exclusion was inapplicable.
It explained that "[w]hether the occurrence is accidental must be viewed
from the standpoint of the insured, and since the oil spill was neither
expected nor intended by Lansco, it follows that the spill was sudden and
accidental under the exclusion even if caused by the deliberate act of a
third party."67
Case No. 2: In Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Insurance
Group,68 an aluminum recycler mixed aluminum dross, a by-product of
its primary aluminum product, with rock salt and heated the mixture to
the boiling point. The process created a gaseous fog. Although the man-
ufacturer used a "bag house" pollution control system to filter the gas,
the system frequently malfunctioned. Four years after the manufacturer
had begun receiving complaints, one such cloud of gaseous fog obscured
a nearby highway. The driver of an automobile was killed as a result.
The court held that under these circumstances, the emission of gases was
63. See Ashland Oil Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982)
(coverage excluded for fire and contamination of refinery crude oil stock as a result of injecting
hazardous waste into a crude oil pipeline).
64. Some courts distinguished between "intent" in tort law and "intent" under contracts
of indemnity where the specific damage needed to be "intended." See, e.g., Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D.C. Or.
1966); Atlantic Cement Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 91 A.D.2d 412, 459 N.Y.S.2d 425
(1983), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 798, 481 N.Y.S.2d 329, 471 N.E.2d 142 (1984).
65. 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363
(1976), certif denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
66. Id. at 278-79, 350 A.2d at 521-22.
67. Id. at 282, 350 A.2d at 524 (emphasis added).
68. 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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not "sudden and accidental. 69
Although Barmet [the recycler] could not predict exactly
when its pollution control system would malfunction, it was
shown that Barmet's system malfunctioned on a regular and
frequent basis, ranging from daily to occasional. Barmet was
aware of this problem and had received numerous complaints.
With this factual background, we cannot accept Barmet's con-
tention that the discharge of the emissions was sudden and ac-
cidental within the meaning of the policy.7"
The Barmet court also adopted a probabilistic analysis and held that
the emissions, under these facts, could not be described as unintentional.
Although Barmet may not have intended for the emissions
to obstruct the visibility and thus perhaps, contribute to the
accident, this problem was certainly foreseeable because
Barmet had received numerous complaints regarding their
emissions. Barmet may have been unable to predict the exact
time when the emissions would be discharged, but they certainly
knew the emissions would continue as a part of their business
operations. We remain unpersuaded that the accident was un-
foreseeable and unpredictable.7 1
The same type of probabilistic analysis has been applied to the continu-
ous emission of an allegedly carcenogenic and noxious vapor which in-
jured employees, 72 to the dumping of toxic wastes which injured the
dump's underlying aquifer,73 and to the general discharge of caustic
wastes which damaged a municipal sewer system.74
We recognize that like numerous other issues, intent may, in a par-
ticular setting, require a factual rather than legal analysis. The factual
averments of a pleading often will be insufficient to enable a court to
determine the issue. But even the summary judgment mechanism may
be inadequate to determine the issue of intent. The following example
demonstrates that the intent analysis necessary for determining the in-
demnification issue requires a thorough factual inquiry. In Reliance In-
69. Id. at 202.
70. Id. at 203.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Stockdale v. Agrico Chem. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Iowa 1972); National Stan-
dard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. CA-3-81-1015D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1983).
73. Waste Management of Carolina, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 70PA85 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, NC file); American States
Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
74. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985).
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surance Co. of Illinois v. Martin,75 a parking lot structure was located
next to a residential condominium structure. The plaintiff complained
that carbon monoxide "regularly" entered her condominium unit and
that soot entered the unit at "diverse times through the ventilating
grates, walls or floors."' 76 In her pleading, however, she did not allege
information necessary to determine the indemnification issue, such as the
number of occurrences, whether such soot or carbon monoxide invaded
other condominium units, whether she or other residents had ever com-
plained of the situation, or how the parking lot operator could have been
expected to know that such fumes could be blown into the condominium
unit.
Under these circumstances, the court held that a summary judg-
ment had been improperly entered." It indicated that the question of
intent should be resolved at a plenary trial, stating that "[t]he relevant
question is not the time frame involved but whether Martin Co., the in-
sured, could have intended or expected carbon monoxide and soot to
enter the plaintiff's condominium unit.
'7
Regrettably, the judicial analysis of intent has become a confused
welter of legal formulas more likely to obscure analysis than to aid it.
Certain courts have stated that "coverage will not be provided for in-
tended results of intentional acts but will be provided for the unintended
results of an intentional act."' 79 While this formulation has aesthetic vir-
tue, it fails to consider the link between cause and effect. This simplistic
formula, applied to the three example cases, would result in coverage for
the polluting aluminum recycler even though its management intention-
ally failed to adopt reasonable environmental safeguards. The inten-
tional polluter would be able to escape the consequences of its acts
although, on an objective basis, it should have recognized the high
probability that further emission of gaseous vapors would result in per-
sonal injury or environmental harm. Like the person who shoots into a
crowd, the corporate manager should not be rewarded for his subjective
failure to appreciate the gravity of his action or inaction.
75. 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (1984).
76. Id. at 95, 467 N.E.2d at 288.
77. Id. at 98, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
78. Id.
79. Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J.
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982). Accord Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvent &
Chem. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co.,
73 A.D.2d 486, 488-89, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (1980).
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2. The "pollutants" definition
The probabilistic analysis set forth above also has been followed by
certain courts in defining whether various activities are "pollutants" or
the cause of "pollutants,"80 and thus subject to the pollution exclusion.
In one such case, a plaintiff, claiming injury as a result of exposure to
toxic substances in gasoline, sued the company which had designed and
constructed a self-serve gasoline station.81 The mere possibility that such
a service station could be improperly operated was not, the court held, a
basis for applying the pollution exclusion to the designer.82 The de-
signer's management decision was not focused upon pollution-causing
activities: "The pollution causing commercial activity that is the subject
of the underlying tort action is the day-to-day operation of the gasoline
filling station, an activity in which plaintiff was not involved, directly or
indirectly. " 83 Thus, the court held that the designer-contractor was enti-
tled to a defense from its insurance carrier.
84
Similarly, another court considered a claim by a company engaged
in the business of cleaning and painting bridges." There, errant spray
from a bridge-painting job damaged passing vehicles. In his affidavit, the
painter stated that although he took precautions, a certain amount of
over-spraying was inevitable in such operations. The insurer did not con-
trovert this assertion. Furthermore, when accepting the risk, the insurer
was aware of the nature of plaintiff's business and knew that plaintiff had
previously received over-spray complaints. The court accordingly deter-
mined that the claim "was not for pollution damage"86 and, thus, cov-
ered under the painter's insurance policy.
C. Analytic Confusion Leads to Inconsistent Results
The interpretational analysis we have suggested above rests on the
proposition that the pollution exclusion clause should be interpreted con-
sistently with its underlying social policy. The rote application of legal
principles pertinent in the auto accident policy coverage context is insuf-
ficient in the environmental context. Utilization of the auto accident
80. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
81. Autotronic Sys. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 403, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 506
(1982).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 404, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
84. Id.
85. A-1 Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 1377
(1981).
86. Id. at 895-96, 632 P.2d at 1380. Cf. Pepper Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d
1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977).
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model has not led to principled court decisions in pollution insurance
coverage cases, cases which could potentially facilitate responsible corpo-
rate decision-making having significant environmental consequences.
Several cases involving virtually the identical factual situation illus-
trate the confusion which exists among various courts. In each case, the
insured claimed that it was entitled to insurance coverage for environ-
mental damage it caused to a dump site's underlying aquifer resulting
-from its dumping of polluting materials. At each dump site, the polluter
continuously dumped improper substances without considering the effect
on the environment.
In American States Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,87 the
court held that the polluter was precluded from recovery."" The court
reasoned that the dumping had occurred over a period of time, and that
dumping, by its nature, is integrally involved with the business of the
dump site. In addition to denying the insured's indemnification claim,
the court held that the polluter was not entitled to a legal defense from its
insurer.8 9 The court focused upon "the policy behind the pollution ex-
clusion clause [which is] to prevent industries from seeking insurance
coverage rather than stop polluting the environment."9 Because of the
social policy involved, the court concluded that "[t]he pollution exclu-
sion clause was not intended to exclude coverage previously provided,
but was intended to eliminate any doubt that may have existed concern-
ing coverage for damages caused by the emission of pollutants as a regu-
lar or continuous part of the insured's business."'"
Conversely, in a virtually identical situation, the court in Jackson
Township Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co.,92 recognized but would not resolve the social policy issue presented.
The court did acknowledge, however, that the pollution clause was in-
tended to deprive an "active polluter" of coverage.93
In Jackson Township, the landfill operator failed to design and main-
tain the fill properly. Pollutants dumped onto the property seeped into
an aquifer. The court first referenced the familiar rule of interpreting a
87. 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
88. Id. at 1553.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538
(1981)). Accord Waste Management of Carolinas v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 70PA85 (N.C. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 18, 1986) (available Mar. 28, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, NC file); see supra text
accompanying note 38.
91. American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1553.
92. 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
93. Id. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
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policy against the insurer and in favor of the reasonable expectations of
an insured.94 It then properly attempted to distinguish between intended
and unintended results of intentional acts:
The chemical manufacturer or industrial enterprise who dis-
charges, disburses or deposits hazardous waste material know-
ing, or who may have been expected to know, that it would
pollute, will be excluded from coverage by the clause. The in-
dustry, for example, which is put on notice that its emissions
are a potential hazard to the environment and who continues
those emissions is an active polluter excluded from coverage. 95
The court determined, however, that a landfill operator who collected
liquid waste and dumped it on property designated to accept that waste,
was carrying out its public function.9 6 Thus, it concluded that the land-
fil operator's ignorance of the probable consequences of its acts could be
ignored: "[I]t was never expected or intended that the waste would seep
into the aquifer resulting in damage and injury to others."9 7
The court in Jackson Township never focused upon the need to as-
sess the responsibility of the corporate decision-maker for his action in
designing and operating the dumpsite. In the closing years of the twenti-
eth century, however, it is too late to contend that environmental protec-
tion is not an issue of general public concern. In attempting to satisfy
that public concern, both public and private entities which have an effect
on the environment must be forced to recognize their social obligations.
Hence, it is necessary that those commercial decision-makers consider
the consequences of their acts before a polluting incident occurs rather
than later in the litigation context.
The Jackson Township court's failure to consider the dump opera-
tor's refusal to protect the environment, either by designing or operating
his landfill properly, promotes a social dereliction. The very essence of a
landfill operator's responsibilities is to accept waste materials and to pre-
vent resulting environmental damage. To permit such operators to es-
cape the adverse consequences of their acts does nothing for the
environment except create the possibility that, on an occasional basis, the
responsibilities of the polluter (or more specifically, the adverse environ-
mental consequences which result from his irresponsibility) will be
passed on to his hapless insurance carrier. In essence, the court's conclu-
94. Id. at 161, 451 A.2d at 992.
95. Id. at 164, 451 A.2d at 994.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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sion in Jackson Township disregards the social policy of causing the deci-
sion-maker to consider environmental effects before acting.
The foregoing analysis is somewhat complicated, to be sure, by the
insurer's obligation to defend. Most states indicate that an insurer has an
obligation to defend its insureds separate and apart from its duty to in-
demnify them. Moreover, the scope of the insurer's duty to defend is
much broader than the scope of its duty to indemnify.9" In addition, as
we have discussed, there will be cases involving the applicability of the
pollution exclusion in which consideration of the social policy underlying
the exclusion may not be relevant.99 More specifically, in a case involv-
ing a particular industry, it may be necessary to examine in detail the
probability of harm resulting from the polluter's actions as well as the
gravity of that harm. Presumably, the court may also consider the social
utility of the actions undertaken. Prevailing industrial and commercial
practices may also have to be considered. Whether a summary judgment
or a plenary declaratory trial action is appropriate will be for the court to
determine. In any event, the guiding consideration should be an objec-
tive focus upon the ability of a polluter to foresee the risk of environmen-
tal damage created by his or her actions.
In any subsequent declaratory action for interpretation of the rights
and obligations under the insurance policy, the basic focus should be
upon the measures taken by the polluter from the outset to recognize and
prevent pollution. In this respect, it may be helpful to contrast the result
in Reliance Insurance Co. of Ill. v. Martin,"° the parking lot operator
case, with another decision which discussed a relatively similar issue
outside the scope of the pollution insurance exclusion.
In Luthringer v. Moore,"° ' the court considered a claim for personal
injuries resulting from plaintiff's inhalation of hydrocyanic acid gas. The
defendant was retained to exterminate cockroaches and other vermin in
the basement under a restaurant in a commercial building in Sacramento,
California. Although the fumigation operation was confined to the base-
ment, gas unexpectedly penetrated the pharmacy on the first floor, injur-
ing plaintiff.0 2 The trial court considered the operator's efforts to
confine the gas, the failure of various witnesses to detect any gas odor in
the locations reached, the possibility of air currents blowing the gas in
98. See, e.g., CNA Casualty of Cal. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 605,
222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (1986).
99. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
100. 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 457 N.E.2d 287 (1984).
101. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
102. Id. at 492-93, 190 P.2d at 3-4.
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various directions, the efforts of the operator to seal all cracks around
doors and windows and other receptacles permitting penetration, the de-
fendant's efforts to vacate adjoining space, and other safety measures,
including the defendant's posting of warning signs. 10°
Similar factors should be considered in determining whether an al-
leged polluter will be able to shift liability for the environmental damage
he causes to another. In the garage case, for example, what reasonable
safety precautions should the parking lot operator have taken in design-
ing and operating the structure when viewed against the magnitude of
environmental harm likely to result if his activities miscarried?
The analysis of the applicability of the pollution exclusion clause is
similar to the California judiciary's treatment of punitive damages. Puni-
tive damages may be enforced against a corporation although no individ-
ual in the corporation specifically intended to hurt or maim a particular
person. 1" Nonetheless, as evidenced by the well-known decision involv-
ing the Ford Pinto automobile, such corporate decisions are subject to
punitive damage liability.105 This is so even though only mid-level cor-
porate management was aware of the potential of harm to others and
there was no corporate "intention" to hurt any particular individual.106
The financial consequences of such inappropriate actions are borne by
the corporate wrongdoer, not the insurance carrier.107 Otherwise, corpo-
rate entities would not be deterred from undertaking reprehensible con-
duct. If punitive damage liability were insurable, the imposition of
punitive damages would not serve as a deterrent. 10 8
This California public policy analysis is directly applicable to judi-
cial interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause in California. Cali-
fornia courts have refused to argue social policy in the two cases
involving the pollution exclusion clause with which they have dealt.
In the first such case, Pepper Industries v. Home Insurance Co.,109
the pollution exclusion clause was, from a social policy perspective, to-
tally irrelevant to the problem presented. The insured made a single dis-
charge of 5000 gallons of gasoline into a city's sewer system.
103. Id. at 492-94, 190 P.2d at 3-4.
104. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981).
105. Id. at 819-20, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87.
106. Id. at 814-17, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87.
107. Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 380, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63
(1981).
108. Id. at 380-81, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 62-63.
109. 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977).
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Subsequently, an explosion and fire resulted from the discharge.1 The
insurer's contention of nonliability for fire suppression costs and property
damage was rejected. 1" The court concluded that because the insured's
misconduct did not result in environmental harm, the pollution exclusion
clause was not applicable:
A fair reading of the endorsement leads to the conclusion it was
intended to exclude insurance coverage resulting from pollution
and contamination of the environment, be it land, water or the
atmosphere. Although the City's sewer and pumping station
may reasonably be said to fit into one or more of these catego-
ries, the fact remains the City is not claiming [that] its facilities
were polluted or contaminated but rather that they were de-
stroyed or damaged by an explosion and fire.'
12
In the other pollution exclusion case involving California law, Healy
Tibbitts Construction Co. v. Foremost Insurance Co. ,113 a federal district
court considered a discharge of oil in the context of a sinking barge. The
barge had a hole in its hull. As the barge removed piling and other deb-
ris, it began to list as water entered the hole. Although it was moved into
shallow water, it continued to take on additional water until it sank. As
the barge submerged, oil escaped into the water from an open vent in the
fuel tank which had supplied the boiler. The barge operator apparently
made no attempt to contain the oil." 4 Consistent with the social policy
analysis we have set forth above, the court refused to mechanically apply
general contract principles related to the construction of insurance poli-
cies."1 It rejected the applicability of the rule that where two perils
cause a loss, one which is insured against and the other which is ex-
cepted, an insured is entitled to coverage.11 6
If such an argument were accepted-given the fact that oil can
never escape from a barge without the intervention of some
other factor-[an insured] could claim that Section 6 makes
[the insurer] liable whenever there is an oil spill. In such cir-
cumstances, [an insured] could always contend that the inter-
vening factor is a "covered" peril which "caused" the excepted
peril of oil pollution. This would be tantamount to reading the
110. Id. at 1014, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
111. Id. at 1019-20, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
112. Id. at 1019, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (emphasis added).
113. 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
114. Id. at 833.
115. Id. at 836.
116. Id. at 836-37.
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Pollution Exclusion Clause out of the policy altogether. 117
Although the court ultimately refused to read the pollution exclusion
clause out of the policy, it did not rely on social policy in reaching its
decision.
D. The Pollution Exclusion and the Insurer's and Insured's Obligation
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
That portion of the CGL policy containing the pollution exclusion is
a small but very important part of a greater whole. The social policy
underlying the pollution exclusion, of course, cannot be implemented in a
vacuum. Environmental pollution is only one of many problems which is
dealt with in the insurance policy. Numerous decisions have considered
the long-standing environmental damage resulting from continuing oc-
currences."1 8 However, a consideration of the various conflicting theo-
ries upon which those decisions are predicated would not add to our
discussion of the pollution exclusion.
Moreover, the implementation of the pollution exclusion cannot be
extricated from the general principle that the insured owes its insurer a
duty of good faith just as much as the reverse.119 The rule requiring,
good faith by the insured to the insurer gains special significance in the
context of the pollution exclusion. The definition of good faith is gener-
ally stated to be that "[i]n every contract, including policies of insurance,
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Broadly
stated, that covenant require[s] that neither party do anything which will
deprive the other of the benefits of the agreement."1 20
Where an occurrence extending over a number of years results in
environmental harm, it is self-evident that a number of insurance policies
issued by different insurers may be involved. Furthermore, the insured
may have chosen to carry a large portion of the risk itself. In the com-
mercial context, it is common for an insured to retain a very large de-
ductible, generally known as a Self-Insured Retention (SIR). In effect,
the business entity assumes the status of insurer as well as insured, with
an attendant good faith obligation. A primary insurance policy is issued
117. Id.
118. See, eg., CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265
(1984), rev'd, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (1985).
119. See, eg., Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,
920, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713-14 (1980); Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North
Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1979); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 787, 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91, 95 (1977).
120. Seamen's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686
P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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to provide the first layer of insurance benefits above the insured's SIR.
The business then may obtain insurance from one or more excess carriers
in the layers above the primary insurance policy. A typical insurance
program, for example, might contain a $500,000 SIR by the insured, a
$2,000,000 insurance policy by a primary carrier, a first layer excess pol-
icy of $5,000,000 and a second layer excess policy of an additional
$5,000,000. The liability limits of such policies and the net coverage in
relation to the SIR of the insured are matters of business judgment.
In the context of environmental damage such insurance programs
take on heightened significance. First, the inclusion of a SIR assumes
that the insured will be called upon to pay the initial retained amount
over each such year. In return for a lower premium, the insured, in ef-
fect, elects to assume the insuring obligation itself. Under these circum-
stances, the insured has an obligation to pay those amounts before it can
call upon the insurer to pay any excess. 121 Although the pollution may
have extended over a number of years requiring the attention of numer-
ous insurers, again, it is self-evident that the insured obtains a benefit
from the insurer. In return for the insured's assumption of a large SIR, it
pays lower premiums to its insurance company. Hence, in assuming cov-
erage for the act of pollution, the insured must pay for the consequences
of its decision to accept the SIR.
Second, the election by a corporate entity to have a large SIR in
return for a low insurance premium interacts with the insured's recogniz-
able desire to avoid the consequences of that decision when it has caused
pollution damage over a period of time. An insured currently holding a
large SIR might be tempted to claim its losses incurred prior to the as-
sumption of its own insurance liability. The thrust of California author-
ity, however, precludes an insured from shifting the date of injury so as
to increase the burden upon a particular insurer.
In one case, for example, an insured received various claims during
two successive years.' 2 2 The insured, in conjunction with its current in-
surer, claimed that all of the losses had occurred in the prior year. Thus,
a greater liability was imposed on the predecessor insurer than the prede-
cessor's policy required. The court held the insured and the successor
insurer liable for breach of the duty of good faith each owed the prede-
cessor carrier.123 The same reasoning would apply to an insured who
121. Nabisco, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 831, 836, 192 Cal. Rptr. 207,
209 (1983).
122. Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 153
Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1979).
123. Id.
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fails to pay the amount of various SIWs in order to shift the costs to a
particular carrier. It should not be able to shift these costs by claiming
that all of the losses should be paid in a single policy period when, in fact,
multiple years are involved.
These principles are equally applicable to the relationship existing
between a primary insurer and the excess insurer. Unless the primary
insurer exhausts the limits of its liability, there is no obligation of the
excess carrier to pay any sums.124 If the primary carrier fails to act in
good faith toward the excess carrier in settling the claim, it similarly can
be held liable for the consequences of its acts.12 5
IV. CONCLUSION
At bottom, the insurance pollution exclusion implements society's
decision that corporate decision-makers bear the burden for adverse con-
sequences resulting from their decisions to degrade the environment. Be-
cause corporate business decisions are rarely challenged, society's only
hope for preventing initial decisions with pollution consequences is to
impact the decision-maker directly. By eliminating insurance coverage
for an active polluter's refusal to adopt appropriate safety measures, soci-
ety can create cleaner air, purer water and a healthier environment.
Concerns that arise while cleaning up the previously avoidable conse-
quences are plainly too late: the environment already has been harmed.
124. See Continental Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384,
389-90 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employer Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App.
3d 593, 598, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (1981).
125. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental Casualty Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 387 (N.D. Cal. 1981). But see United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1985).
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